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A FRAUDULENT SENSE OF BELONGING: 
THE CASE FOR REMOVING THE
 ‘FALSE CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP’
By: Anne Parsons 1
I. Introduction
I have been a permanent resident for about 10 
years.  When I decided to apply for US citizenship 
I realized that I might be ineligible because when 
applying for my first driver’s license I also became 
registered to vote.  At the time, I did not understand 
that permanent residents are not allowed to vote. The 
fact that a governmental official asked me to register 
(even though at that point my greencard  was my only 
official ID) and actual issuance of  a registration 
card made me even more ensured [sic] that I am 
an eligible voter.  If  I recall correctly, the Election 
Day was shortly after and I am almost positive that 
I voted during these elections.  However, soon later, 
when talking with another greencard holder I was 
informed that I am not eligible to vote.  Since that 
point on, I never voted and whenever asked if  I wish 
to register I make a point to inform those who ask 
that “as a permanent resident I am not eligible.”  
Other than that, my record is perfectly clean.  Do 
I still have a chance to become naturalized?  Is 
it truly a deportable offense?  Is there a way, and 
should I try to find out whether I actually voted?  
There must be more people who made the same 
mistake as I did, is there a way to find out what 
percentage is denied citizenship on similar grounds?2
 A little known fact in U.S. history is that noncitizens3 
once had the right to vote in local, state, and even national 
elections.4  Today, not only are noncitizens largely prohibited 
from voting, except in a few local jurisdictions, noncitizens may 
lose their chance to become citizens, and face the additional 
threats of  deportation and criminal sanctions for voting or 
merely registering to vote.  While noncitizens have always 
faced consequences for fraud or willful misrepresentation 
of  a material fact under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”),5 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of  19966 (commonly known as “IIRIRA” 
or “IIRAIRA”) changed the law in several ways, including by 
adding specific grounds of  inadmissibility and removability 
related to voting in any local, state, or federal election.7
 This paper criticizes IIRIRA’s addition of  the “false 
claim to citizenship” provision to regulate noncitizen voting 
as inconsistent with the proper role of  immigration law 
in creating and defining the body politic.  Part I explores 
democratic concepts of  citizenship in the context of  
noncitizen voting rights.  This view of  citizenship as political 
voice and belonging, however, must inevitably confront the 
perceived imperative of  the modern nation-state to create 
legal distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.  Part I 
then explores how the U.S. does so by examining theories 
underlying the naturalization process and looking specifically 
at how “citizenship” is defined in current U.S. immigration law.
 Part II briefly examines the connection between 
immigration policy and the gradual erosion of  noncitizen 
voting rights as a backdrop to IIRIRA’s creation of  the 
“false claim to citizenship” provisions.  In Part III, the paper 
argues that the IIRIRA amendments to the “false claim to 
citizenship” provisions have several negative consequences. 
First, the provisions risk unnecessarily excluding or 
deporting viable candidates for citizenship, including long-
time legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) like the individual 
in the epitaph.  Second, these provisions validate unfounded 
concerns about noncitizen voter fraud, thereby further 
polarizing the immigration debate in unproductive ways.  And 
third, the provisions are inconsistent with the underlying goals 
of  the naturalization process, and jeopardize noncitizens’ 
opportunity for meaningful political participation.
 The paper concludes by suggesting various ways 
the false claim to citizenship provisions could be reformed, 
arguing that removing the immigration consequences 
for noncitizens who vote is most in line with democratic 
ideals.  It calls upon immigrants’ advocates to reconsider 
arguments for extending voting rights to noncitizens 
in light of  predicted demographic change and the 
growing push for Comprehensive Immigration Reform.
II. What Makes a Citizen?
 The legal definition of  “citizen” is “a person 
who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of  a 
political community, owing allegiance to the community and 
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections.”8 
Constitutional democracies are premised on the notion 
of  consent by the governed, with the vote serving as the 
primary mechanism through which members of  the polity 
realize democratic ideals.9  All democracies index insiders 
and outsiders based on existing members’ collective notions 
of  who constitutes “the people.”  If  formal citizenship 
is the marker of  membership in the political community, 
this means that in a democracy, noncitizens are governed 
by the laws but do not have a formal voice. 10  Why and 
how is formal citizenship taken into account in defining 
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the body politic?  In its reference to naturalization, the 
definition of  citizenship hints at another fundamental 
question: how do nations, and the U.S. in particular, 
determine who becomes a citizen in the first place?
a. Citizenship as Political Voice and Belonging 
 Today, with a few exceptions,11 formal citizenship is 
the primary marker of  an individual’s inclusion or exclusion 
in the body politic in the U.S.12  Despite the fact that certain 
classes of  noncitizens, LPRs in particular, share many 
characteristics with citizens—they pay 
taxes, own property, and serve in the 
armed forces—only citizens can vote. 
And yet, this has not always been the case.
 In his socio-historical account 
of  noncitizen voting rights in the 
U.S., Maryland State Senator and Law 
Professor Jamin Raskin, notes that the 
extension of  voting rights to noncitizens by states stemmed 
from a strong federalist paradigm.13  Depending on the time 
period, states had different reasons for allowing noncitizens 
to vote.14  In the eighteenth century, states extended the 
right to vote to propertied, white, male noncitizens both 
because they exhibited those attributes most valued in 
electors, and because doing so allowed states to justify 
the exclusion of  people without those attributes from 
the ballot by delinking citizenship from the franchise.15 
Later, in the nineteenth century, states used the franchise 
primarily to draw noncitizens to settle in their territory.16
 Raskin derives three interrelated normative 
arguments for alien suffrage based on state’s express or 
implied rationales for allowing noncitizens to vote.  First, 
doing so logically follows from the democratic ideal of  
“citizenship as presence,” in that extending the right to 
vote to noncitizens merely recognizes those individuals’ 
participation in the social life of  the community.17  Second, 
allowing noncitizens to vote serves the practical function of  
assimilating them to local values, a rationale Raskin terms 
“citizenship as integration.”18  A third and similar rationale, 
“citizenship as standing,” reconstitutes the vote as a form 
of  public acknowledgement that noncitizens belong in 
American society.19  The latter two rationales provide strong 
justification for extending the vote to individuals who intend 
to naturalize.  Although current U.S. immigration law does not 
explicitly distinguish between those who intend to become 
citizens and those who do not, LPR status is the closest 
proxy even though LPRs are not required to naturalize.  Not 
surprisingly, serious arguments have been made that LPRs 
should be able to vote at the local level,20 and a few localities 
in the U.S. have extended the franchise to this group.21 
Serious consideration of  the first rationale, however, has 
the potential to lead to a more radical conclusion: that all 
noncitizens with presence and a significant stake in their 
communities should have a voice in all those communities 
in which they participate, whether local, state, or national.22
 Theoretically speaking, however, a democracy is 
not obligated to extend suffrage to noncitizens.23  The U.S. 
Constitution does not deny noncitizens the right to vote, 24 
yet arguably neither does it require it.25  Whether a nation-
state chooses to extend the vote to noncitizens might depend 
on that particular state’s constitutional values in relation 
to noncitizens.26  The more constitutional protections 
a state grants to noncitizens, the 
more important it becomes for 
citizens to maintain the vote as a 
distinguishing and exclusive right.27 
Correspondingly, the more courts 
extend to noncitizens the rights to due 
process, free speech, and association, 
the less crucial the vote is for ensuring 
noncitizens’ political voice and sense of  belonging.28  As 
one scholar points out, this may explain why “[noncitizen] 
suffrage is, at once, insignificant and central” in the U.S.29
b. Citizenship as Membership in a Nation-State
 In today’s world of  increased border restrictions, 
the effect of  immigration law in defining the body politic 
has become increasingly important.30  The increasing 
overlap between immigration, criminal, and national 
security law has greatly enhanced the gate-keeping function 
of  immigration law in the U.S.31  As a prime symbol of  
these conceptual overlaps, IIRIRA’s amendments to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) significantly 
expanded the exclusionary function of  immigration law.
 Historically, immigration law played a minimal role 
in regulating noncitizen voting rights, which instead were 
regulated by state election laws.  Generally, laws that govern 
the lives of  noncitizens already living in the U.S. are termed 
“alienage laws,” as distinct from immigration laws which 
determine who has the right to be present in the first place.32 
In the U.S., both alienage laws that restrict noncitizens’ right 
to vote, and immigration laws that delineate the grounds of  
inclusion and exclusion, play a role in defining the body politic. 
In comparison, in countries such as New Zealand that allow 
noncitizens to vote in national elections, immigration laws 
alone define the people.33  In reality, alienage and immigration 
laws often overlap,34 but they remain nonetheless analytically 
distinct.35  For example, alienage laws often receive strict 
scrutiny by the courts,36 while Congress retains plenary 
power over immigration law.37  Though both types of  laws 
play a role in defining the electorate, essentially, this paper 
argues that using immigration law, rather than alienage law, 
the effect of  immigration law in defining 
the body politic has become 
increasingly important
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to regulate noncitizen voting undermines the democratic 
ideals the immigration system should seek to promote.38
 A society’s immigration statutes reflect its 
perception of  how the process of  national self-definition 
should take place.  Conversely, whether and how a society 
permits noncitizens to vote depends on that society’s 
ideas about how the integration of  
noncitizens should occur.39  According 
to Immigration Scholar and Historian 
Hiroshi Motomura, U.S. immigration 
law is a blend of  three competing 
views of  immigration:  immigration 
as contract, immigration as affiliation, 
and immigration as transition.40  Each view reflects a model 
of  justice based on differing notions of  the relative equality 
between citizens and noncitizens.  Under the contract 
theory, citizens and noncitizens are not equal.41  Lawful 
immigrants have the right to remain in the U.S. only so long 
as they obey the rules.42  For Motomura, contract theory 
is inadequate as an exclusive foundation for immigration 
law because the contract is one-sided—the immigrant 
must take it or leave it.43  This violates the requirement 
of  consent underlying modern democratic politics.44
 Affiliation is the second conceptual foundation 
and serves as immigration law’s counterpart to Raskin’s 
notion of  “citizenship as integration.”  Viewing 
immigration as affiliation means that the longer that 
lawful immigrants remain in the U.S., the more citizen-
like rights they gain.45  Paradoxically, the more the law 
prioritizes a person’s ties to the U.S., the less important 
formal citizenship becomes as a means of  gaining rights.46
One form of  relief  in U.S. immigration law that seems 
to reflect the affiliation concept is cancellation of  removal. 
Cancellation of  removal is a form of  relief  that allows 
noncitizens who are otherwise inadmissible or deportable 
to stay in the U.S. based, in part, on their length of  residence 
in the country and other equities including the presence of  
family, property, or business ties. 47  In general, Motomura 
sees current U.S. immigration law as a blend of  the contract 
and affiliation theories.48  While the rationale for cancellation 
of  removal recognizes the inherent unfairness in severing 
an individual’s ties to the U.S., in reality, the law also contains 
an element of  contract.  To be eligible for cancellation of  
removal, for example, both LPRs and other noncitizens 
(“non-LPRs”) must prove that they have not committed 
certain types of  crimes.49  It is also worth mentioning, though 
perhaps not surprising, that the law as applied to non-LPRs 
includes more stringent “contractual terms” in addition to 
requiring a longer period of  residence to establish eligibility.50
 In contrast to the first two views, immigration 
as transition means that all lawful immigrants are treated 
as potential citizens upon entry and thus benefit from a 
presumption of  equal rights.51  Only when an immigrant 
expresses her intention not to naturalize would that person 
lose her citizen-like rights.52  While not erasing the distinction 
between lawful immigrant and citizen completely, the 
view of  immigration as transition would tend to support 
voting rights for intending citizens.  Motomura argues 
that, historically, the concept of  
transition played an important role. 
In particular, he points to declarations 
of  intent to naturalize, a feature of  
U.S. immigration law from 1795 to 
1952, which could be filed by eligible 
noncitizens several years in advance 
of  a naturalization application, and which elevated the 
noncitizen to a pre-citizen status.53  For Motomura, the history 
of  transition and its emphasis on inclusion is an antidote 
to the logic of  the other two concepts, which pervades 
the U.S.’s increasingly restrictive immigration policies.54
 
c. Citizenship in U.S. Immigration Law 
 If  immigration law plays a role in defining the body 
politic, citizenship and naturalization are the primary means 
by which it does so.  People gain citizenship by birth in the 
U.S.,55 through naturalization,56 or in limited cases, by blood.57 
The naturalization process in the U.S. has traditionally been 
characterized as easy or open by international standards, which 
reflects the importance of  naturalization as a governmental 
objective.58  In other words, the U.S. government can justify 
retaining a firm citizen/noncitizen distinction as an incentive 
for people to naturalize, so long as it compensates by making 
the transition to citizenship a relatively quick process.59
Very generally, to qualify for citizenship, 
naturalization applicants must have lived in the U.S. 
for at least five years as an LPR,60 or three years if  they 
are spouses of  U.S. citizens.61  Applicants must meet a 
minimum period of  physical presence in the U.S.,62 in 
addition to demonstrating “good moral character.”63
 In practice, the transition to citizenship is easy for 
many people, and the denial rate is relatively low.64  Still, 
denial rates do not account for those who fail to apply out 
of  fear of  being denied.  Many potential citizens find the 
English and civics requirements insurmountable obstacles. 
Others may not be able to pay the $675 application fee. 
Still others may not apply out of  fear that past crimes 
or violations of  immigration law will lead to a denial, or 
even deportation.  With IIRIRA’s dramatic expansion 
of  the grounds for inadmissibility to, and removal 
from, the U.S., these fears have gained new currency.
the more the law prioritizes a person’s ties 
to the U.S., the less important formal 
citizenship becomes as a means of  
gaining rights.
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III. From Suffrage to “Falsely Claiming Citizenship”
a. Restrictive Immigration and the Erosion of  Noncitizen Voting 
Rights  
 An undeniable correlation exists between U.S. 
immigration policy and noncitizen voting rights.65 
Noncitizens voted and held local office throughout the 
colonies beginning as early as 1692.66  The extension of  
voting rights to noncitizens in the U.S. occurred during a 
period of  relatively open immigration.  During the early 
colonial period, the federal government left the regulation 
of  immigration, including alien suffrage, largely to the 
states.67  Its first attempt to create uniformity among the 
states came with the passing of  the 1790 Naturalization 
Act, which regulated who could become a U.S. citizen.68 
The federal government only began to centralize 
control of  immigration in the late nineteenth century.
 Not surprisingly, throughout history, “the rise and 
fall of  xenophobic and nationalist tendencies” has greatly 
impacted both immigration law and immigrant voting 
rights.69  During the War of  1812, for example, increasing 
suspicion of  non-English immigrants decreased popular 
support for noncitizen voting, 70 though voting rights 
expanded again in the years leading up to the Civil War.71  At 
the height of  noncitizen voting in 1875, twenty-two states 
and territories had extended the franchise to noncitizens.72 
Beginning that same year, however, the U.S. government 
passed a series of  exclusion laws due in part to the influx of  
Chinese immigrants.73  As anti-immigrant sentiment began 
to rise around the turn of  the century, states one by one 
terminated voting rights for noncitizens.74  The final end to 
noncitizen suffrage roughly coincides with the end of  World 
War I,75 which also put an end to unlimited immigration 
and led to the creation of  a nation-origins quota system.76
 Even though the U.S. government eventually 
centralized control over immigration matters, it did not seek 
to regulate noncitizen voting.  In fact, the government did 
not create a provision barring entry for misrepresentation, 
the statutory precursor to IIRIRA’s false claims provisions, 
until after World War II.77  In 1952, the drafters of  the 
INA supported incorporation of  the misrepresentation 
provision into the permanent statute as an anti-communist 
measure.78  Initially, the INA’s provisions related to false 
claims were narrowly drawn:  noncitizens were only guilty 
of  making a false claim to citizenship if  the claim was 
made to a U.S. government official for the purpose of  
securing admission into the U.S.79  The 1986 Immigration 
Marriage Fraud Amendments80 significantly strengthened 
the fraud provisions, but continued to limit their application 
to noncitizens who made material representation 
for the purpose of  receiving immigration benefits.81
b. IIRIRA: A Fraudulent Sense of  Belonging?
 These provisions changed again for the worse in 1996 
when President Clinton signed IIRIRA into law.  IIRIRA 
closely followed another piece of  legislation, the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of  199682 (“AEDPA”), which 
was enacted one year after the Oklahoma City bombing 
to combat domestic and international terrorism.  IIRIRA, 
on the other hand, focused on illegal immigration reform. 
According to former INS General Counsel, Paul W. Virtue, 
IIRIRA represented the culmination of  
immigration-reform efforts that began with 
the Republican Party assuming majority 
control of  the House and Senate in 1994.  
Congress was faced with the task of  trying 
to strengthen our national security in the 
wake of  the 1992 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, while at the same time, 
trying to find a way to discourage illegal 
migration.  What had started as separate 
bills, one designed to reduce the annual 
number of  family and employment-based 
immigrants to the United States  
(legal immigration) and the other designed 
to address border security and deportation 
issues (illegal immigration), were combined 
in each house and then split again due to 
a concerted grass-roots lobbying effort.  
Separated from the more popular illegal-
immigration bills, the legal-immigration 
measures were defeated in both houses.83
Although Congress rejected the proposed bill on 
restrictions for “legal immigration,” many of  IIRIRA’s 
provisions, including those related to noncitizen voting, 
have nonetheless affected authorized immigrants.84
 Few of  IIRIRA’s sixty-plus provisions are immigrant-
friendly.  To achieve its goal of  curbing unauthorized 
immigration, IIRIRA strengthened border security, initiated 
the border fence project, added three and ten-year bars to re-
admission for immigration violators, tightened eligibility for 
cancellation of  removal, streamlined removal proceedings 
for certain classes of  immigrants, and severely restricted 
judicial review.85  The legislation also instituted electronic 
employment verification pilot programs, and removed 
public benefits for most undocumented immigrants while 
tightening eligibility restrictions for lawful immigrants.86
 Similarly, AEDPA and IIRIRA both expanded 
the criminal and non-criminal grounds of  inadmissibility 
and removal.87  IIRIRA also broadened the fraud 
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provisions of  the INA and made penalties more stringent 
to support efforts to curb unauthorized immigration 
at the border and in the workplace.88  IIRIRA added a 
ground of  inadmissibility, which effectively extended the 
applicability of  the general misrepresentation ground to 
false claims of  citizenship made to private employers.89 
It also added a comparable ground of  removability90 and 
made it a crime to make a false claim of  citizenship.91
 Even though the general false claim to citizenship 
provisions could technically encompass unlawful voting 
by immigrants, Congress added parallel provisions to 
deal specifically with that issue.  Section 347 of  IIRIRA 
creates new grounds of  inadmissibility and removal for 
noncitizens who vote in violation of  “any Federal, State, 
or local constitutional provisions, statute, ordinance, or 
regulation.”92  Though section 347 technically only applies 
to noncitizens who have actually voted, a noncitizen who 
unlawfully registers to vote may also be inadmissible or 
removable under the broad “any purpose” language of  the 
general false claim to citizenship provisions.93  In contrast to 
the unlawful voting provisions, the false claim provisions do 
not require a finding that the individual violated underlying 
election law, only that the person falsely represented herself  
as a U.S. citizen on or after September 30, 1996 for the 
purpose of  registering to vote or voting.94  Unlike the 
general false claims provisions, the provisions that apply 
specifically to unlawful voting are applicable retroactively.95
 Interestingly, IIRIRA creates two separate criminal 
penalties for unlawful voting.  Section 216 makes noncitizen 
voting in federal elections a general intent crime, punishable 
by fine and/or one year prison 
sentence.96  In addition, IIRIRA further 
provides that knowingly making a false 
statement or claim to vote or register 
to vote in any Federal, state, or local 
election constitutes a felony punishable 
by fine and/or five years in prison.97 
In 2000, the Child Citizenship Act98 (“CCA”) added an 
exception to the inadmissibility, removability, criminal 
prosecution, and finding of  lack of  good moral character 
provisions related to false claims to citizenship and unlawful 
voting, but it is extremely limited in its application.99
 Given Congress’s addition of  specific and undeniably 
harsh provisions to deal with noncitizen voting, this was 
presumably an issue of  major concern.  The legislative 
history, however, is silent on these provisions.  On one 
hand, their addition makes sense given Congress’s general 
intent to curb fraud with the enactment of  IIRIRA.  On 
the other hand, the provisions do not even loosely relate to 
the prevention of  unauthorized immigration—the prospect 
of  voting in U.S. elections is not likely a main reason that 
people cross the border without authorization.  Perhaps the 
provisions were meant to appease those voters who believe 
that politicians should not pander to noncitizens who cannot 
vote anyway, though this is merely speculation.  Whatever 
the reason, as discussed below, the impact of  the provisions 
clearly falls hardest on legal immigrants, specifically those 
applying to adjust status and legal permanent residents.
IV. The Negative Consequences of  an Illogical 
Punishment
a. Immigration Consequences of  Falsely Claiming Citizenship
  
 Although noncitizens are prohibited from voting 
in all federal, and most state and local elections, registering 
to vote as a noncitizen is fairly easy and many noncitizens 
may do so inadvertently.  The National Voter Registration 
Act of  1993100 (also known as the “Motor Voter Act”) 
requires states to provide individuals with the opportunity 
to register to vote when they apply for or renew their 
driver’s license.101  Only fifteen states require documentary 
proof  of  citizenship at the Department of  Motor Vehicles 
(“DMV”).102  Many states simply require the driver’s license 
applicant or the DMV clerk to check a box to indicate the 
individual’s citizenship status.103  Other states do not require 
any proof  of  citizenship.104  DMV employees routinely ask 
driver’s license applicants whether they would like to register 
to vote and do not have to verify that the person is actually 
eligible to vote.105  Noncitizens asked by a governmental 
official may assume they are eligible.  Similarly, community-
based organizations and voter registration campaigns may 
also encourage noncitizens to vote. 
Lastly, in contrast to the first two 
situations in which the noncitizen 
registers inadvertently, the possibility 
exists that some noncitizens knowingly, 
and without encouragement, 
register to vote and vote.
 The above scenarios raise a key question—the issue 
of  intent.  The provisions that specifically address unlawful 
voting do not explicitly require intent.  If  a noncitizen 
votes in violation of  federal, state, or local election law, that 
individual may be found inadmissible or removable under 
these provisions.106  Intent does come into play, however, in 
the determination of  whether the noncitizen violated election 
law by voting if  the election statute requires a showing of  
specific intent.  Department of  Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
policy guidelines clarify that in cases where the underlying 
election law requires a finding of  specific intent, adjudicating 
officers must assess the circumstances surrounding 
the voting accordingly.107  If  the officer determines the 
individual knowingly violated the relevant election law, 
the individual is removable subject to the officer’s exercise 
Only fifteen states require documentary 
proof  of  citizenship at the 
Department of  Motor Vehicles 
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of  prosecutorial discretion.108  If  there is no evidence of  
specific intent and the statute requires such a showing, then 
presumably the individual cannot be deemed removable.
 It is less clear whether an individual can be deemed 
inadmissible or removable absent a showing of  intent 
under the general provisions, which apply to false claims 
of  citizenship for any purpose or benefit under state or 
Federal law.109  The answer may hinge on the meaning of  
“false” in the context of  these provisions, a question which, 
to date, no courts have addressed.  One citizenship expert 
suggested conflicting interpretations of  the provision 
based on two distinct meanings of  “false.”110  A court may 
construe the provision as embodying an intent requirement 
based on the common understanding that false implies 
“intentionally untrue.”111  On the other hand, a court may 
construe Congress’s use of  “falsely claiming” as an attempt 
to distinguish this provision from adjacent ones dealing 
with fraud and misrepresentation.112  The former provision 
would clearly result in fewer immigration consequences 
for noncitizens who are charged with inadmissibility 
or removability under the false claims provisions,113 
but for the moment, there is little indication how the 
immigration agencies are actually implementing them.
 The fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to 
vote may become relevant at four points: application for 
a nonimmigrant visa, application for relief  from removal, 
adjustment of  status, and naturalization.  It is unclear if  
and how the various immigration agencies’ policies for 
handling noncitizen voting issues differ, and whether some 
agencies go to greater lengths than others to determine 
whether a noncitizen has unlawfully voted or registered to 
vote.  Still, the following discussion outlines the provisions’ 
potential to negatively impact noncitizens at each stage.
i. Application for Nonimmigrant Visa
 The provision may impact “nonimmigrants,” a legal 
term used to designate noncitizens whose presence in the 
U.S. is authorized on a temporary basis.114  A nonimmigrant 
visa applicant who violates the false claims or unlawful 
voter provisions can apply for a waiver.115  An otherwise 
inadmissible applicant may only be granted admission 
as a temporary nonimmigrant at the discretion of  the 
Attorney General.116  To qualify for a nonimmigrant visa, 
however, most applicants must demonstrate that they do 
not intend to stay in the United States.117  An individual 
who has previously voted or registered to vote in the U.S. 
will likely have a hard time convincing a consular office 
that she does not have the intention of  staying.118  Thus, 
in most circumstances the waiver will mean very little.
 
ii. Adjustment of  Status
 Under the INA, adjustment of  status is treated 
as an admission to the U.S. 119  Thus, if  a noncitizen 
becomes inadmissible as result of  making a false claim 
to citizenship for the purpose of  voting or registering to 
vote, or voting unlawfully, this will bar her from adjusting 
her status to permanent residence.120  While there is a 
waiver available for immigrants who are inadmissible under 
the general misrepresentation provision, 121 there are no 
waivers available for those who are found inadmissible as 
a result of  false claims to citizenship or unlawful voting.122
 Currently, it is unclear how aggressively DHS 
checks whether an applicant has registered to vote at 
the adjustment of  status stage.  There are no questions 
pertaining to unlawful voting on the adjustment of  status 
application.123  Still, some applicants have been denied on 
these grounds.124  Regardless, given the increasing integration 
of  government databases, a mere change in policy 
could make screening of  this kind routine procedure. 125
iii. Relief  from Removal
 If  a noncitizen is found removable as a result of  
voting-related violations, she can still apply for relief  from 
removal.  Unlawful voting or a false claim to citizenship 
can affect eligibility for relief  in several ways.  First, if  the 
individual is in exclusion proceedings and the violation 
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, the individual 
will be statutorily barred from applying for non-LPR 
cancellation of  removal.126  DHS has determined that a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f), the specific intent 
provision, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.127 
There do not appear to be any cases challenging this 
designation, perhaps because convictions for knowingly 
making a false statement or claim to vote or register to vote 
are rare.  In the same policy statement, DHS indicates that a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 611, the general intent provision, 
likely do not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.128 
Interestingly, if  a noncitizen were found to have been 
convicted of  a crime involving moral turpitude as a result of  
unlawful voting or false claims to citizenship, theoretically 
that individual could apply for a discretionary waiver,129 even 
though there is no way to directly waive the false claim to 
citizenship or unlawful voting grounds of  inadmissibility. 
If  the individual is in removal proceedings, rather than 
exclusion proceedings, false claims to citizenship constitute 
an independent bar to non-LPR cancellation of  removal.130
Second, even if  the conviction does not constitute a 
crime involving moral turpitude a violation may preclude an 
individual from establishing good moral character, a statutory 
requirement for certain forms of  relief  such as non-LPR 
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cancellation of  removal and voluntary departure.131  Any 
two or more convictions, regardless of  whether the offenses 
involve moral turpitude, can preclude a finding of  good 
moral character if  the aggregate sentences to confinement 
were five years or more.132  Additionally, confinement to a 
penal institution for 180 days or more bars a finding of  good 
moral character.133  An individual can only avoid the bar if  he 
or she met the narrow exception established by the CCA.134
Lastly, even in the absence of  a criminal conviction, 
a violation negatively factors into the discretionary 
analysis accompanying many applications for relief  
including asylum, voluntary departure, and both LPR 
and non-LPR cancellation of  removal.  For noncitizens 
who lack strong equities, voting or registering to vote, 
could be a deciding factor in a denial of  relief, depending 
on the immigration judge.  Further, many types of  
discretionary decisions are not subject to judicial review.135
  
iv. Naturalization
 The provisions’ biggest impact is likely to be at the 
naturalization stage.  After IIRIRA, all officers conducting 
naturalization interviews are required to ask the applicant if  
she has ever voted or registered to vote in any election in the 
United States.136  In addition, the application for naturalization 
was amended to include questions related to false claims 
and voting.137  If  the individual violated relevant election 
law or made a false claim to citizenship when registering to 
vote or voting, and the applicant does not qualify for one 
of  the CCA exceptions, the adjudicator’s decision to initiate 
removal proceeding is one of  prosecutorial discretion.138
 If  the adjudicator decides that the case merits 
prosecutorial discretion, the adjudicator must still make a 
good moral character finding.139  If  a 
noncitizen has actually been convicted 
under either of  the voting related 
provisions, then the same analysis 
outlined above applies.140  In the 
absence of  a conviction or a finding 
that a conviction constitutes a crime 
involving moral turpitude, DHS policy guidelines suggest 
that if  the violation occurred in the distant past and the 
individual can establish good moral character “in spite of  
making a false claim to U.S. citizenship,” the adjudicator 
may exercise her discretion favorably, though DHS 
guidelines set the bar fairly high.141  If  the adjudicator 
denies the application, the noncitizen must apply for 
administrative review of  the decision within thirty days.142 
If  she fails on the second review, as a last resort, the 
applicant can petition a federal district court to conduct 
a de novo review of  her eligibility for naturalization.143
 It is impossible to tell how often voting-related false 
claims determine the outcome of  an application because 
DHS does not publish statistics of  its denial rate specific 
to these grounds.  It is equally impossible to tell how many 
LPRs do not file applications for fear that they will be denied. 
The lack of  immigrant waiver and very limited exception 
means the laws will have the hardest impact on applicants 
at the adjustment of  status and naturalization stages, in 
other words, the most viable candidates for citizenship.
 
b. Polarizing the Immigration Debate
 Immigration law defines the body politic “by 
establishing a ladder of  accession to permanent residence 
and then formal U.S. citizenship.”144  The immigration 
debate focuses on what set of  criteria a noncitizen must 
be required to meet before her inclusion into the body 
politic.145  Although lawmakers may have rational reasons 
for withholding voting rights for noncitizens,146 it does 
not follow that it is thus rational or necessary to deny 
immigration benefits to and potentially deport noncitizens 
who vote or register to vote in violation of  election law.
 Congress enacted IIRIRA in response to the 
growing fears over “illegal immigration.”147  Ironically, 
since the enactment of  IIRIRA, immigration experts 
have criticized the legislation on the grounds that it has 
contributed to an increase in the number of  unauthorized 
immigrants in the U.S.148  It is no coincidence that IIRIRA 
passed shortly after AEDPA, which Congress enacted 
primarily to combat the threat of  international terrorism. 
Advocates and academics alike have decried the increasingly 
frequent discursive linkages made by lawmakers between 
illegal immigration, crime, and terrorism as a sort of  fear-
mongering.149  While the rule of  law and national security are 
undeniably of  utmost importance to all 
members of  a society, the negative 
consequences of  this rhetoric are 
clear: an increasingly polarized, and 
oftentimes vitriolic, immigration debate.
 The thrust of  the debate is the big 
question of  line drawing—who is “in” 
and who is “out” and, just as important, who has the right to 
decide.  In the context of  voting rights, the debate centers on 
the issue of  voter fraud.  Anti-immigrant advocacy groups 
and media personalities frequently allege that noncitizen 
voting is undermining the integrity of  the electoral process 
and manipulating election outcomes.150  These voices use fear 
of  widespread voter fraud by noncitizens to gain support 
for stricter immigration policies.151  The false claims and 
unlawful voter provisions validate and legitimize those fears, 
regardless of  the real—de minimis—extent of  the problem.
 Those seeking to counter claims of  widespread voter 
fraud by noncitizens frequently argue that voter fraud is rare, 
Immigration law defines the body politic 
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largely because the consequences of  committing voter fraud 
are so disproportionate to the individual’s gain of  a single 
vote.152  Though convincing, this argument is not alone 
sufficient to counter arguments in favor of  maintaining the 
IIRIRA provisions.  For one, if  noncitizen voter fraud is a 
myth then the false claims and unlawful 
voting provisions do no harm.  Likewise, 
one might argue, if  noncitizens do 
commit voter fraud, then the provisions 
are necessary as a deterrent in the 
rational actor’s cost-benefit analysis. 
There are several responses, however, 
that highlight both the irrationality and the destructive effect 
of  IIRIRA’s false claims and unlawful voting provisions.
 First, even if  noncitizens are voting or registering 
to vote, studies have largely debunked the myth that 
noncitizen voting has improperly influenced elections.153 
Those individuals who violate election laws likely do so 
unintentionally.  Either they believe they are citizens, 
or they are not aware that only citizens can vote.  Many 
noncitizens may register to vote, at the DMV for example, 
but never actually cast a vote, in which case they have no 
effect on the outcome of  elections.  There have been a few 
incidents or allegations of  larger-scale voter fraud.154  In 
those types of  cases, however, individual noncitizens are 
led to believe they can vote by trusted community-based 
organizations.  These situations are likely to be rare.  Even 
where noncitizens face draconian enforcement measures, 
like what is currently happening in Arizona,155 immigrant 
advocacy groups are unlikely to risk the political and 
criminal consequences of  encouraging noncitizens to vote 
when alternate methods of  advocacy exist.  Thus, as long 
as advocacy groups are aware of  the voter restrictions, they 
are unlikely to use noncitizen voting as a strategic tool.
 Second, the IIRIRA provisions are not necessary to 
deter voter fraud.  The laws likely do not factor into the 
individual’s decisional calculus because most noncitizens, 
and even many immigration attorneys, are not aware of  
the consequences of  making a false claim to citizenship or 
even what making a false claim entails.156  Even assuming 
that noncitizens are aware of  the consequences of  
making a false claim in the context of  voting, the threat 
of  deportation or denial of  immigration benefits is not 
necessary to deter noncitizens.  Noncitizens who knowingly 
commit voter fraud can be prosecuted under existing 
state and federal laws, which impose significant penalties 
for unlawful voting.157  Immigration law can then treat 
these convictions the same way they treat all convictions. 
From a deterrence perspective, it is simply not necessary 
to create separate grounds of  inadmissibility and removal.
 Using deportation to sanction noncitizens for voting 
or registering to vote is grossly disproportionate to the offense, 
especially if  the noncitizen did so unknowingly.158  A single 
fraudulent vote is not likely to undermine the integrity of  the 
electoral process, and yet, the consequences of  deportation 
to an individual are enormous.159  Neither agency discretion 
nor the availability of  forms of  relief  mitigates this fact.160 
For one, cancellation of  removal and 
other forms of  removal relief  are quite 
limited in their availability.161  Second, 
in both cases, the adjudicator—
either an immigration judge or an 
agency official—is choosing between 
imposing the sanction or not imposing 
the sanction.162  Thus, the exercise of  discretion does not 
“inject proportionality” into the immigration system, simply 
put, because there are no alternative sanctions available.163
 Lastly, even if  noncitizen voting is rare, the IIRIRA 
false claims and unlawful voting provisions are far from 
benign.  For one, the provisions apply not only to those 
who vote, but also to those who register to vote.164  Those 
noncitizens that are found inadmissible or removable 
for either violation are equally negatively impacted—they 
may be denied immigration benefits and face possible 
deportation.165   In addition, the provisions bolster the 
rhetoric of  anti-immigration advocates.  Perhaps most 
disturbing, however, is their symbolic import.  In essence, 
the IIRIRA provisions use elections, the symbol of  the 
democratic process itself, to enforce immigration law.  It 
is difficult to imagine what could be further from the 
aspirational view of  democracy as “citizenship as presence.”166
 
c. An Improper Role for Immigration Law
 The tension between democratic norms of  inclusion 
and the inherently exclusive function of  immigration law 
may never be fully resolved.  Still, as Motomura suggests in 
his analysis of  three different conceptions of  immigration 
law, society can choose the degree to which it incorporates 
notions of  equality into the immigration system.167 
Regardless of  a society’s ultimate decision to incorporate 
noncitizens into the political process, the body politic has 
a duty to ensure that U.S. immigration law both serves the 
needs of  society and reflects societal ideals.168  In this respect, 
IIRIRA’s provisions represent a huge step backwards.
 Motomura’s call to view immigration as transition 
requires revisiting the idea of  extending voting rights to 
noncitizens.169  For Motomura, “immigration as transition 
means treating lawful immigrants as Americans in waiting 
from their first day in this country.”170  Because immigration 
as transition presumes full equality for LPRs who intend 
to naturalize,171 logically, this leads to the conclusion that 
LPRs should have some voting rights.172  Raskin and others 
have convincingly argued that LPRs should be allowed to 
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vote in local elections.173  Motomura echoes these proposals 
with the qualification that voting rights for LPRs should be 
temporally limited to the five-year period during which they 
are not allowed to naturalize.174  Motomura’s proposal to 
view immigration as transition bears significant resemblance 
to the history of  noncitizen voting in the U.S. as described by 
Raskin.  For Motomura, immigration law could do a better 
job of  recognizing the role of  LPRs in modern American 
society (“citizenship as standing”).175  In addition, extending 
the franchise to LPRs serves the 
practical function of  “foster[ing] civic 
education and involvement as aspects of  
integration and transition to citizenship” 
(“citizenship as integration”).176
 Prior to the enactment of  
IIRIRA, noncitizen voting in the 
U.S. most closely resembled Motomura’s second concept 
of  immigration as affiliation.  The logic of  immigration 
as affiliation prescribes that lawful immigrants gain rights 
proportionate to their length of  time in the country.177  In 
a system that is mostly based on the affiliation concept, 
the importance of  naturalization is deemphasized since 
LPRs eventually gain most of  the rights of  citizenship.178 
Motomura points out that in certain European countries that 
closely fit the immigration as affiliation model of  citizenship, 
resident noncitizens are allowed to vote in local elections.179 
If  naturalization is a priority in the U.S., under the affiliation 
rationale, it makes sense to withhold certain rights, such as 
the right to vote, in order to provide noncitizens with the 
incentive to naturalize.180  The withholding of  voting rights, 
however, is only justified so long as noncitizens actually 
benefit from other constitutional protections.181  While it is 
debatable whether the rights of  noncitizens were sufficiently 
protected prior to the enactment of  IIRIRA, when noncitizen 
voting rights were governed exclusively by election law (with 
criminal sanctions attached), the balance, though perhaps 
not ideal, was still justifiable under democratic principles.
 The landscape changed with the enactment of  
IIRIRA, which essentially gave immigration law a role to play 
in regulating noncitizen voting.  This aspect of  immigration 
law now most fully embodies the view of  immigration as 
contract, with the grounds of  inadmissibility and removal 
representing the “terms” of  the contract.  Before, noncitizens 
who voted unlawfully had only to suffer the criminal 
consequences, though still severe, of  their actions.  Now, the 
fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to vote is by itself, 
sufficient grounds for terminating that individual’s “contract” 
to remain in the United States.182  The contract theory of  
immigration, as described by Motomura, is premised on 
the notion that fairness and justice can be achieved through 
notice, promise, and expectations, rather than through any 
assumption that noncitizens are entitled to equal rights.183
 There are numerous problems with this rationale in 
the case of  the false claims and unlawful voting provisions. 
First, the terms of  the contract are unclear—what is a “false 
claim to citizenship” anyway?184  Second, at least in the case 
of  the unlawful voting provision, which applies retroactively, 
noncitizens do not get notice.185  Third, noncitizens may 
not reasonably expect to be denied immigration benefits 
or deported for voting or merely registering to vote. 
Motomura echoes the concerns, discussed above, about 
the inadequacy of  cancellation of  
removal and discretion for preserving 
fairness.186  Lastly, noncitizens have 
little choice over the terms.187  While 
Motomura highlights the unequal 
bargaining power of  noncitizens vis-
à-vis many aspects of  the immigration 
system, nowhere is this more clearly reflected than in the 
IIRIRA provisions: noncitizens may be deported for 
participating, even unknowingly, in the process through 
which their political rights are denied in the first place. 
In that sense, the IIRIRA provisions are doubly punitive.
 While these provisions make up only a small part 
of  the immigration system as a whole, they are nevertheless 
important because of  the values they reflect.  The provisions’ 
attempt to validate the concerns of  some citizens that the 
line between citizen and noncitizen has grown blurry risks 
further marginalizing noncitizens from the political process. 
Noncitizens have the right to participate politically through 
grassroots organizing and other informal channels.188 
Even if  one accepts the premise that denying noncitizens 
the right to vote is a legitimate part of  self-definition in 
a democracy, the IIRIRA provisions go one step too far 
in that they deny noncitizens even the potential to have 
a voice—formal or informal.  In Motomura’s words, “In 
the context of  national self-definition, focusing only on 
promises, notice, and expectations is too narrowly utilitarian 
and cavalier in its dismissal of  equality, even where, as in 
immigration and citizenship, some inequality is assumed.”189
V. Time for Radical Reform?: The Meaning of  
“Citizenship” for Noncitizens
 As currently written, the IIRIRA false claims 
and unlawful voting provisions solidly reject the notion 
of  “citizenship as presence.”  This paper has argued that 
these provisions have threatened rather than protected 
American democratic ideals.  There are many easy fixes 
that could mitigate their effects to some degree.  Congress 
could amend the provisions to explicitly incorporate 
a specific intent requirement, or make an immigrant 
waiver available, similar to one that exists for fraud and 
misrepresentation.  In the end, however, these solutions 
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do not go far enough.  If  naturalization and integration 
are main goals of  the immigration system, immigration law 
cannot treat formal citizenship as an impermeable border. 
At the very least, the provisions must be removed.  Even 
then, more is required to transition to a system that more 
fully accounts for the true role of  noncitizens in society. 190
 From an advocacy perspective, these provisions 
should be a wake-up call.  Certainly, for the time being, 
immigration attorneys must pay greater attention to the 
implications of  these provisions for their individual clients. 
But, the provisions raise even greater issues in the context 
of  immigration reform: in whatever form it is likely to take, 
it is ironic that those most likely to be affected do not have a 
formal voice in the process.  Advocacy groups should push 
for the removal of  these provisions, which both literally and 
symbolically silence the noncitizen voice.  Advocates should 
also consider pushing for more radical reform, perhaps 
even going so far as to reinvigorate the noncitizen suffrage 
movement.  Given the growing political influence of  recently 
naturalized citizens, 191 the time may soon be right for such 
a movement, even if  its scope is limited to voting rights at 
the local level.192  In the end, if  the project of  self-definition 
excludes individuals like the one whose story began this 
paper, we have to question the validity of  the project.
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